The Ukraine Crisis and the Building of a New International System
‘The Ukraine Crisis and the Building of a New International System’ was originally published as the lead article of the June 2022 issue of?Wenhua Zongheng?(文化縱橫). The article urges China, amid the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to consider the dangers of the current international system that it has been striving to integrate into and the possibilities of building a new international system.
The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis has not merely altered the geopolitical landscape, it has severely disrupted the current international order. Particularly, the imposition of extensive sanctions on Russia by the United States and other Western countries has compromised the rules of the existing international system and revealed its true, coercive nature. This crisis should provide a strong reminder to China that it must deepen its ‘worst-case scenario thinking’ (底線思維, dǐxiàn sīwéi) and seriously contemplate, as a major strategic aim, building a new international system parallel to the current Western-dominated order.
▍Preparing for Looming Crises
The current international system is one that is dominated by the Western countries, led by the United States, and liberal capitalist in nature. During periods when liberal capitalism functions smoothly, this system expands globally and appears to be rules-based and fair, able to include most countries and regions of the world. However, during periods of crisis, liberal capitalism will contort itself, abandoning established international rules or seeking to create new ones, exemplified by increasing nativism or deglobalisation where the hegemonic nation relinquishes its purported duties of leadership and returns to power politics.
Amidst the Ukraine crisis, the US and the Western countries have disregarded international norms by forcibly casting Russia out of the global financial architecture, namely the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), confiscating Russian state and personal assets, and freezing the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Such measures go far beyond the typical nonviolent means of confrontation employed by nation states such as trade wars, technology blockades, and oil embargoes, and blatantly contradicts the timeless liberal principles that ‘debts must be paid’ and ‘private property is sacrosanct’, among others. These flagrant violations of the so-called ‘rules-based order’ have laid bare the arbitrary, unlawful, and biased character of the international system and the manner in which it can be manipulated by the US and its allies to violently discipline other countries.
From the Chinese perspective, the Ukraine crisis is a warning to China that it must prepare for scenarios in which it is subject to such hostile measures. It is necessary to re-examine the present international order to grasp an accurate understanding of both its benefits and drawbacks, giving up any illusions in its fairness and long-term viability, and, whilst participating in and maximising the utility of the current system, simultaneously making preparations for the construction of a new international order.
Given the size of China, the task of national rejuvenation requires much more than an economic strategy of mere ‘domestic circulation’ (內(nèi)循環(huán), nèi xúnhuán). To achieve industrialisation and modernisation, China must engage with the world and develop a broader ‘international circulation’ (外循環(huán), wài xúnhuán) by accessing external resources, technologies, and markets. The central task of China’s reform and opening-up policy over the past four decades has been to open the country to the outside world and participate in the global system in order to promote an international environment more favourable to the pursuit of modernisation.?At the same time, China has had to take necessary actions when hostile aspects of the current system have threatened the country’s fundamental interests. In the current situation, it is necessary that China, on the one hand, fights steadfastly against the manipulation of the existing system by the US and the Western countries, and, on the other hand, begins to build a new, more democratic and just global system, in partnership with developing countries.
▍China’s Historical Destiny Is to Stand With the Third World
The present world order has not only been shaped by China, Russia, the United States, and Europe, the countries and regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have also created a multitude of new regional networks amid the decline of US power. Working with other developing countries is necessary for China to strengthen efforts to build a new international system. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), since it was proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, has in fact laid the foundation for such cooperation and for the realisation of a new system.
Since the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Third World has consistently provided China with new spaces to survive and grow and new sources of strength whenever it has faced pressure from superpowers, including the national liberation movements of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s, the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement, Mao Zedong’s Three Worlds theory developed in the 1970s, the emphasis on South-South cooperation during the early stages of reform and opening up in the 1980s, the establishment of the BRICS mechanism at the turn of the century, and, most recently, the development of the BRI in the last decade. Over the past 70 years, China has had adopted a wide range of foreign policies, from the ‘lean to one side’ (一邊倒, yībiāndǎo) policy with the Soviet Union in the 1950s to the ‘integrating with the world’ (與國(guó)際接軌, yǔ guójì jiēguǐ) (or with the US, to be exact) policy at the turn of the century; however, China has, consciously or unconsciously, consistently turned to the Third World whenever it has felt that its independence and sovereignty were threatened.
This relationship with the Third World is China’s historic destiny. Today, as China becomes an important pole in the world and is faced with the hostile containment strategy of the hegemonic United States, it cannot follow the alliance politics pursued by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Dividing the world into antagonistic blocs would drive humanity to the brink of war and global catastrophe; instead, China should continue to pursue an independent and nonaligned foreign policy, focused on bringing together the many countries of the Third World – which constitute the global majority – to foster new forms of partnership, establish new multilateral networks, and create a new international system.
Reflecting upon the practices and experiences of the BRI until now and accounting for the challenges posed by the Ukraine crisis, China’s approach towards building a new international system should be guided by the following considerations:
First, China’s orientation should be based on strategic rather than commercial interests. China cannot merely be concerned with exporting its production capacity and capital or securing access to external resources and markets for Chinese enterprises; but rather it must prioritise what is necessary to ensure strategic survival and national development. By adopting such a strategic perspective, it becomes clear that the approach taken by many Chinese firms and local governments towards other nations and regions, as part of the BRI, is not sustainable as it has prioritised commercial interests and tended to ignore political-strategic interests.
Second, the creation of the new international system requires the development of a new vision, philosophy, and ideology to guide and inspire efforts to build it. In this regard, the BRI’s principles of ‘consultation, contribution, and shared benefits’ (共商共建共享, gòngshāng gòngjiàn gòngxiǎng) are insufficient. While the United States today rallies the Western camp under the banner of ‘democracy versus authoritarianism’, China must clearly uphold the flag of peace and development, uniting and leading the vast developing world whilst appealing to and persuading more European states to join this cause. President Xi Jinping’s global call for the ‘building of a community with a shared future for humanity’ (人類命運(yùn)共同體, rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ) should be adapted to the new international situation. The Chinese concept of ‘common prosperity and common development’ should be shared with the world and promoted as a core value in building a new international system.
Third, a ‘Development International’ (發(fā)展國(guó)際, fāzhǎn guójì) should be set up as an institutional entity to create a new global system. Unlike the Western alliance mechanisms, such as the Group of Seven (G7) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which are dominated by a minority of wealthy countries, a new global system must address the fundamental issue that the overwhelming majority of the world faces: how developing countries can be more effectively organised under the principle of nonalignment. Loosely organised and nonbinding initiatives such as conferences and declarations are wholly inadequate for this task; an institutional mechanism such as a ‘Development International’ should be promoted and constructed to drive more powerful organisational action and to develop networks of knowledge and culture, of media and communication, of economic cooperation, as well as other projects. In a nutshell, forms of organisational action under the mandate of peace and development should be established and experimented with.
▍The Relationship Between the Two Systems
Building a new system does not mean abandoning the present one.
In the forty years of reform and opening up, China’s direction and goal have been to integrate into the existing international order. As a latecomer to industrialisation and modernisation, China has had no choice but to learn from the Western countries and take in their advanced knowledge and experience. Breaking away from this system would inevitably drive China back to the old road of the ‘closed-door’ (閉關(guān)鎖國(guó), bìguānsuǒguó) policy of the 1960s and 1970s, cutting the country off from the advanced economies of the present world.
Nowadays, China has travelled a long way down the road of globalisation and has benefited from it; reform and opening up has become bound up with the Chinese people’s basic interests. For this reason, it is neither desirable nor feasible to give up the benefits derived from participating in the current system.
But this by no means negates the urgent necessity of preparing for the threat of the US-led Western alliance sabotaging the present global system. The development of a new international system and the active participation in the present system are two processes that can be implemented simultaneously without conflict, in which the two systems are bound to overlap and interpenetrate each other. When the quantitative changes accumulated by the new system begin to transform into qualitative changes, a brand-new world order will naturally emerge.
烏克蘭危機(jī)與新型國(guó)際體系構(gòu)建
烏克蘭危機(jī)的爆發(fā)，在改變地緣政治格局的同時(shí)，也動(dòng)搖了現(xiàn)行國(guó)際秩序。尤其當(dāng)美國(guó)等西方國(guó)家對(duì)俄羅斯施加了大量違背現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系規(guī)則的制裁時(shí)，這一體系的暴力本質(zhì)便暴露無(wú)遺。它強(qiáng)烈地提醒中國(guó)人，必須加大底線思維力度，認(rèn)真思考構(gòu)建與現(xiàn)行以西方為主導(dǎo)的國(guó)際體系相平行的新型國(guó)際體系這一重大戰(zhàn)略問(wèn)題。
▍應(yīng)為可能的危機(jī)預(yù)作準(zhǔn)備
現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系，是以美國(guó)為首的西方主導(dǎo)控制的國(guó)際體系，其實(shí)質(zhì)是自由主義資本主義國(guó)際體系。當(dāng)自由資本主義運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)順暢時(shí)，這一體系向著全球覆蓋，并顯現(xiàn)出規(guī)則性和中立性，能夠?qū)⒋蠖鄶?shù)國(guó)家和地區(qū)容納進(jìn)來(lái)。而當(dāng)自由資本主義運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)不暢，這一體系便會(huì)扭曲，逆全球化上升，霸主國(guó)家放棄領(lǐng)導(dǎo)責(zé)任，實(shí)力政治回歸，或拋棄國(guó)際規(guī)則，或另起爐灶重建規(guī)則。
此次烏克蘭危機(jī)，美國(guó)等西方國(guó)家違背國(guó)際規(guī)則，強(qiáng)行將俄羅斯踢出國(guó)際金融結(jié)算系統(tǒng)（SWIFT），沒(méi)收俄羅斯國(guó)家或個(gè)人資產(chǎn)，凍結(jié)俄羅斯外匯儲(chǔ)備，其手段遠(yuǎn)超貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)、技術(shù)封鎖、石油禁運(yùn)等原有的民族國(guó)家間非暴力對(duì)抗手段，而是公然違背“欠債還錢”“私有財(cái)產(chǎn)神圣不可侵犯”等古老又現(xiàn)代的原則，充分暴露出現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系非規(guī)則性、非中立性的一面，以及美國(guó)西方操控的國(guó)際體系的暴力政治的本質(zhì)。
烏克蘭危機(jī)提示中國(guó)人，必須為類似的危機(jī)預(yù)作準(zhǔn)備。其中的核心要義，在于重新審視當(dāng)今國(guó)際秩序，準(zhǔn)確把握其中的利與弊，放棄幻想，在參與并用好現(xiàn)有的國(guó)際體系的同時(shí)，盡快準(zhǔn)備新型國(guó)際體系的構(gòu)建。
以中國(guó)的體量，欲完成民族復(fù)興偉業(yè)，僅僅局限于“內(nèi)循環(huán)”是不夠的。中國(guó)的工業(yè)化和現(xiàn)代化，必然要走出去，通過(guò)利用外部資源、技術(shù)和市場(chǎng)，形成廣泛的外循環(huán)。中國(guó)近40年改革開放的核心任務(wù)之一，就是對(duì)外開放，加入現(xiàn)有國(guó)際體系，搭建有利于中國(guó)現(xiàn)代化的國(guó)際關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)。然而，當(dāng)現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系發(fā)生扭曲變形，并可能傷害到中國(guó)的根本利益時(shí)，中國(guó)當(dāng)然要有所行動(dòng)。一方面，要通過(guò)堅(jiān)定的斗爭(zhēng)，抗衡美國(guó)等西方國(guó)家對(duì)現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系的操控；另一方面，則應(yīng)逐漸搭建以中國(guó)為主導(dǎo)的新型國(guó)際體系。
▍選擇第三世界國(guó)家是中國(guó)的歷史宿命
當(dāng)今世界，中、俄、美、歐之外，是廣大的亞、非、拉國(guó)家和地區(qū)，是美國(guó)力量收縮之后的大量新中間地帶。向這些國(guó)家和地區(qū)尋找新的力量源泉，是中國(guó)建構(gòu)新型國(guó)際體系的當(dāng)然選擇。起自2013年，由習(xí)近平主席倡導(dǎo)的“一帶一路”倡議，事實(shí)上已經(jīng)構(gòu)成了新型國(guó)際體系的實(shí)現(xiàn)基礎(chǔ)。
新中國(guó)成立以來(lái)，每當(dāng)中國(guó)在超級(jí)大國(guó)壓迫之下欲尋找新的生存發(fā)展空間和新的力量來(lái)源時(shí)，第三世界國(guó)家便會(huì)自動(dòng)成為不二選擇。從上世紀(jì)50~60年代的亞非拉民族解放運(yùn)動(dòng)，到70年代毛澤東的“三個(gè)世界理論”，從80年代改革開放時(shí)代對(duì)于“南南合作”的熱情推動(dòng)，到世紀(jì)之交“金磚五國(guó)”機(jī)制的探索，乃至最近10年的“一帶一路”倡議。這70多年間，雖然經(jīng)歷了50年代對(duì)蘇聯(lián)的“一邊倒”，經(jīng)歷了世紀(jì)之交的“與國(guó)際接軌”（實(shí)質(zhì)是與美國(guó)接軌），但只要中國(guó)感受到獨(dú)立自主地位面臨威脅時(shí)，便會(huì)自覺不自覺地轉(zhuǎn)向廣大的第三世界。
這恐怕就是中國(guó)的歷史宿命。當(dāng)今日中國(guó)已經(jīng)崛起為世界一極，并面臨霸主美國(guó)的全面遏制之時(shí)，它的選擇并不會(huì)重復(fù)蘇聯(lián)和美國(guó)的結(jié)盟政治道路，以集團(tuán)對(duì)抗助推世界走向危險(xiǎn)的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)邊緣，而是始終保持不結(jié)盟的獨(dú)立自主姿態(tài)，同時(shí)將更廣大的第三世界國(guó)家團(tuán)結(jié)起來(lái)，構(gòu)建新型伙伴型關(guān)系，由此形成獨(dú)特的新型國(guó)際關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)和新型國(guó)際體系。
總結(jié)“一帶一路”迄今為止的實(shí)踐，面對(duì)烏克蘭危機(jī)之際的挑戰(zhàn)，這一新型國(guó)際體系應(yīng)該具備如下特質(zhì)：
第一，這一體系應(yīng)該是戰(zhàn)略性的，而非商業(yè)性的。它不僅是中國(guó)的產(chǎn)能輸出與資本輸出需求，也不僅是中國(guó)企業(yè)走出去尋找外部資源與外部市場(chǎng)的需求，而且是服從于中國(guó)的戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展與戰(zhàn)略生存的根本需求。在這樣的戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)下，目前中國(guó)許多企業(yè)和地區(qū)對(duì)“一帶一路”沿線國(guó)家只講商業(yè)利益、不講政治戰(zhàn)略利益的行為便是不可持續(xù)的。
第二，新型國(guó)際體系的構(gòu)建必須有新的理念和愿景，必須有新型意識(shí)形態(tài)的指引，工具方法層面的“共商、共建、共享”是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠的。今日美國(guó)，以“民主vs威權(quán)”為旗幟團(tuán)結(jié)西方陣營(yíng)，中國(guó)應(yīng)鮮明地舉起“和平與發(fā)展”的旗幟，團(tuán)結(jié)帶領(lǐng)廣大的發(fā)展中世界，并說(shuō)服影響更多的歐洲國(guó)家?！叭祟惷\(yùn)共同體”在新的形勢(shì)下應(yīng)得到新的解釋，中國(guó)的“共同富裕與共同發(fā)展”模式應(yīng)該在構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系時(shí)作為核心價(jià)值輸出到全世界。
第三，新型國(guó)際體系應(yīng)以“發(fā)展國(guó)際”作為組織載體。相比于G7、北約等西方國(guó)家結(jié)盟機(jī)制，廣大發(fā)展中國(guó)家在不結(jié)盟機(jī)制下如何進(jìn)行高效的組織動(dòng)員，是擺在新型國(guó)際體系構(gòu)建面前的一個(gè)關(guān)鍵課題。在這方面，僅有松散的論壇、項(xiàng)目等組織形式是遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠的，應(yīng)推動(dòng)形成類似“發(fā)展國(guó)際”的組織機(jī)制，推動(dòng)更加強(qiáng)有力的組織行動(dòng)，并在此基礎(chǔ)上，形成發(fā)展國(guó)際知識(shí)與文化網(wǎng)絡(luò)、發(fā)展國(guó)際媒體與傳播網(wǎng)絡(luò)、發(fā)展國(guó)際工商企業(yè)合作網(wǎng)絡(luò)等組織機(jī)制?？傊?strong>要探索和形成以“和平與發(fā)展”為主題的國(guó)際性的組織行動(dòng)。
▍如何處理兩種國(guó)際體系的關(guān)系
構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系，并不意味著拋棄現(xiàn)有的國(guó)際體系。
改革開放40年，中國(guó)就是以融入現(xiàn)有國(guó)際體系為方向和目標(biāo)的。由于中國(guó)在工業(yè)化和現(xiàn)代化道路上后來(lái)者的身份，向西方世界學(xué)習(xí)，吸收其先進(jìn)的知識(shí)和經(jīng)驗(yàn)，就成為不二選擇。一旦脫離這一體系，中國(guó)勢(shì)必會(huì)回到上世紀(jì)60~70年代“閉關(guān)鎖國(guó)”的道路，與現(xiàn)有世界的先進(jìn)部分喪失聯(lián)系。
今天，中國(guó)已經(jīng)在全球化的道路上愈走愈遠(yuǎn)，成為全球化的受益者，改革開放已經(jīng)成為中國(guó)人民的根本利益。因此，放棄這一參與現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系而來(lái)的根本利益，既不可取，也不可行。
但這絕不意味著我們對(duì)于以美國(guó)為首的西方世界破壞現(xiàn)行國(guó)際秩序的危險(xiǎn)不做準(zhǔn)備。應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到，發(fā)展建設(shè)新型國(guó)際體系是可以與積極參與建設(shè)現(xiàn)行國(guó)際體系并行不悖、互不沖突的。新的體系是增量，舊的體系是存量，它們一定會(huì)你中有我，我中有你。當(dāng)新體系的發(fā)展由量變達(dá)到質(zhì)變的時(shí)刻，一個(gè)嶄新的世界秩序就會(huì)自然形成。
本文發(fā)表于《文化縱橫》2022年6月刊，該期目錄如下，歡迎訂閱紙刊查看更多內(nèi)容：
— ?2022年6月新刊目錄??—
▍編輯手記
烏克蘭危機(jī)與新型國(guó)際體系構(gòu)建
《文化縱橫》編輯部
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張若楓
白宮新一代對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略操盤手的思想素描
楊博文
▍封面選題：巨變來(lái)臨——俄烏沖突改變世界
俄烏沖突在2022 年爆發(fā)，以出人意料的方式改變著整個(gè)世界格局。沖突爆發(fā)以來(lái)，以美國(guó)為首的西方把國(guó)際規(guī)則作為武器對(duì)俄進(jìn)行輪番制裁，深刻且全面地動(dòng)搖“二戰(zhàn)”后幾十年來(lái)的國(guó)際治理體系，和平與發(fā)展的時(shí)代主題面臨前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)。俄烏沖突后的世界將向何處去？
跨越俄烏沖突陷阱：重新思考以規(guī)則為核心的國(guó)際秩序
曹遠(yuǎn)征
構(gòu)建“新三環(huán)”：面對(duì)全面脫鉤可能的中國(guó)選擇
程亞文
作為帝國(guó)間沖突的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)
張昕
歐洲為什么不能掌控自己的命運(yùn)？
魏南枝
重振領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力：俄烏沖突中的英國(guó)戰(zhàn)略
孔元
▍專題：人類文明新形態(tài)
強(qiáng)世功
正是在這短短十幾年中，中國(guó)看待世界的眼光和心態(tài)也悄然發(fā)生了變化：從凸顯中國(guó)特色的特殊主義敘事，轉(zhuǎn)向更為包容世界的普遍主義敘事；從追求被西方承認(rèn)的刻意努力，轉(zhuǎn)向平和心態(tài)的自我認(rèn)同。這種變化最直觀地體現(xiàn)在兩次奧運(yùn)會(huì)的開幕式上。
王立勝、晏擴(kuò)明
▍觀念
史觀重建：從“主旋律”到“新主流”
陶慶梅
2021年《覺醒年代》《山海情》等作品的出現(xiàn)，不但打破了“主旋律”與大眾文化之間的界限，在市場(chǎng)上創(chuàng)造出良好的口碑；更重要的是，它們通過(guò)開辟一種新的歷史敘事方式，呼應(yīng)了這個(gè)時(shí)代被掩藏著的某種社會(huì)情緒，帶動(dòng)了更多年輕觀眾的情感，造就了屬于這個(gè)時(shí)代的主流價(jià)值。
周安安、吳靖
從“未來(lái)人”到“頑童”——日本動(dòng)漫與社會(huì)秩序的張力
潘妮妮
從不同時(shí)期的代表性作者與作品中，我們看到了日本動(dòng)漫文化中未成年人位置的變遷：從改造世界的“未來(lái)人”，到被教養(yǎng)的未成年人，再到輕視成人世界并主動(dòng)疏離的“頑童”。這反映了并不存在一個(gè)價(jià)值統(tǒng)一的日本動(dòng)漫文化，正如戰(zhàn)后日本成人社會(huì)的思潮也并非始終如一。
▍社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)變遷
“波蘭尼時(shí)刻”在當(dāng)代中國(guó)
酈菁
中國(guó)無(wú)法避免全球“波蘭尼時(shí)刻”重現(xiàn)帶來(lái)的社會(huì)壓力和不確定性；并且，由于自身龐大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體量和重要的政治地位，中國(guó)必將在其中扮演重要的角色。
▍公益理論與公益實(shí)踐
社會(huì)組織專業(yè)化的中國(guó)實(shí)踐：慈弘基金會(huì)的探索
張婧
▍反思美國(guó)模式
重新審視“地緣政治學(xué)”——一個(gè)世界史的視角
方旭
韓國(guó)“單一民族”的神話與現(xiàn)實(shí)
鄭立菲
《文化縱橫》國(guó)際傳播系列由三大洲社會(huì)研究所（Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, 網(wǎng)站：www.thetricontinental.org）和東聲（Dongsheng News，網(wǎng)站：www.dongshengnews.org)協(xié)作翻譯并制作，有英語(yǔ)、西語(yǔ)、葡語(yǔ)三個(gè)版本。每期根據(jù)不同主題，從《文化縱橫》雜志過(guò)往發(fā)表文章中，選擇3-5篇文章進(jìn)行編譯，預(yù)計(jì)每季度發(fā)布一期。2023年第1期主題為“重構(gòu)現(xiàn)代世界體系”，主要分析全球緊張局勢(shì)加劇背景下的俄烏戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的全球影響，追溯中西關(guān)系的歷史軌跡，并探討團(tuán)結(jié)廣大第三世界國(guó)家、推動(dòng)構(gòu)建新型國(guó)際體系的可能性。
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